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This article examines what it means to produce critical continental philosophy 
in contexts where the label of “continental” may seem increasingly tenuous, if 
not entirely anachronistic. We follow Ghassan Hage in understanding “critical 
thought” as enabling us “to reflexively move outside of ourselves such that we 
can start seeing ourselves in ways we could not have possibly seen ourselves, our 
culture or our society before.”1 Such thought may involve an interrogation of our 
own conditions of knowledge production, by giving us “access to forces that are 
outside of us but that are acting on us causally.”2 Our argument in this article is 
that critical approaches within continental philosophy need to examine a multi-
plicity of ways that disciplines can be defined and delimited, and to understand 
the ways that gender, geography, and coloniality (among other forces) shape the 
intellectual and social worlds of continental philosophy. In doing so, we want 
to consider the ways that familiar debates around intellectual and institutional 
biases might be enhanced by a closer consideration of process-based aspects of 
disciplinary self-reproduction, and we take as our example the Australasian Soci-
ety for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) conference at the University of Tasmania 
(November 29-December 1, 2017).3 We also consider Nelson Maldonado-Torres’ 
notion of “post-continental philosophy,” and reflect on the implications of such 
a venture in the Australian context. But to begin with, we want to navigate a path 
between two modes of criticism commonly directed toward philosophy as a dis-
cipline.
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The first mode of criticism, which we label idealist (in a non-pejorative sense of 
the term), takes philosophy as a relatively coherent field of interlocking proposi-
tions, and seeks to identify key missteps within this field that have allowed phi-
losophers to perpetuate biases and prejudices. This approach tends to begin by 
identifying one philosopher (e.g. Plato, René Descartes, Immanuel Kant) as an 
exemplar of Western and/or European traditions, and by identifying weaknesses 
in this philosopher’s programme that have subsequently affected the priorities 
or capabilities of philosophy. In some cases, this may involve demonstrating that 
the kinds of thinking promoted by this philosopher systematically marginalise, or 
even foreclose, radical ideas that challenge the established edifices of philosophi-
cal endeavour. The most well-known version of this approach points to Descartes’ 
mind/body dualism as evidence that philosophy prioritises mental abstractions 
over embodied experiences, and that the discipline is therefore unable to wres-
tle with social justice issues that demand acknowledgement of corporeal harms, 
lived memory, everyday habits and practices, and so on.4 In a notable variation on 
this approach, Ian Hunter cites Edmund Husserl as the villain of the piece, argu-
ing that the problem with much of what gets called “theory” is its “skepticism 
toward empirical experience,” which it often invokes to sustain petty attacks on 
the social and natural sciences.5 Hunter notes that theory has invented for itself 
a personage, the Theorist, to which philosophers (especially those in the conti-
nental tradition) frequently become attached, one “characterized by the desire to 
interrupt ordinary life and knowledge in order to rise above it, to look down on it, 
to be someone for whom and to whom the world declares itself in all its purity.”6 
The tendency of Theorists to distrust empirical research makes them particularly 
ill-equipped to respond to issues that require documentation through qualitative 
and quantitative methods (e.g. institutional or structural discrimination), such 
that a direct conflict emerges between the Theorist’s system of ideas and progres-
sive disciplinary transformation.
Nevertheless, institutionalised philosophy has proven adept at incorporating the 
criticisms levelled against its ideological tendencies. Indeed, the failures of phi-
losophy have proven fruitful material for meta-critique. As a notable example, 
feminist philosophy has generated compelling criticisms of gender politics in phi-
losophy, and in doing so, has breathed new life into continental philosophy itself, 
expanding its thematic reach and conceptual tools, and allowing philosophy to 
better communicate with innovations in cognate disciplines (psychoanalysis, so-
ciology, cultural studies, politics, and so on). Continental philosophy has a endur-
ing capacity to lurch forward through its crises, precisely because meta-critical 
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reflection—or at least, a certain kind of meta-criticism—is a preferred tool of the 
discipline itself. In some cases, however, the incorporation of criticism through 
meta-critique can contribute to an erasure of the embodied, social and institu-
tional dynamics in play. Aileen Moreton-Robinson makes the following observa-
tion in her commentary on whiteness within Australian studies:
The writer-knower as subject is racially invisible, while the Aboriginal as 
object is visible. The discourse of primitivism deploys the Cartesian model 
to separate the racialised white body of the knower from the racialised dis-
course and knowledge produced by its mind. In this way the body, which 
is the marker of race, is erased leaving only the disembodied mind. White-
ness, as an ontological and epistemological a priori, is seductive in produc-
ing the assumption of a racially neutral mind and an invisible detached 
white body.7
 
In an important example to which we return below, critical commentaries on “co-
loniality” and “decolonial” thinking may easily gain currency in meta-critiques 
of continental philosophy, without any concrete transformation in the relation-
ship between embodied identities and knowledge production, or the ways that 
social identities shape situated understandings of settler colonial societies. Of 
course, ideological beliefs do shape the ways that scholars respond to criticisms 
of, say, Eurocentrism in their disciplines, but we remain unconvinced that this 
problem can be cured solely through public indictments of Platonism, Cartesian-
ism, Kantianism, or the other isms. Continental philosophy has no original sin for 
which mere repentance would suffice; or rather, the persona of the repentant sin-
ner-scholar can easily contribute toward new modalities of group-constitution, 
wherein European philosophers still play leading roles in the theatres of atone-
ment.8
The second mode of criticism, which we label sociological, concerns the insti-
tutional conditions that sustain philosophy as a discipline, including patterns of 
enrolment and recruitment, mentorship and advocacy, promotions and progres-
sion, and so on. In Women In Philosophy: What In Needs To Change?, Fiona Jenkins 
and Katrina Hutchison note that philosophy in Australia, unlike sociology or his-
tory, has seen relatively little improvement in the participation of women since 
the 1960s.9 To this, we can add the well-documented patterns of gender bias in 
academic citations across both analytic and continental philosophy.10 No system-
atic study of philosophy in Australia has investigated inequalities around race, 
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nationality, class or disability, but scholarship from the United States suggests 
persistent biases toward white, middle-class, able-bodied masculinities.11  This 
does not mean that there is a lack of diversity among those persons philosophis-
ing. Many scholars read philosophy, write philosophy and teach philosophy, while 
either not identifying as philosophers, or understanding their philosophical iden-
tity as precarious, especially if they are unable to imagine professional futures 
in the discipline.12 Sally Haslanger argues that social inequalities in relation to 
gender follow from the “cultures” of philosophy departments relative to other 
programs: competitive, combative, judgmental, and “oriented toward individual 
accomplishment.”13 Jenkins also notes the ways that myths of meritocracy (e.g. 
“the best philosophers naturally rise to the top”) come to naturalise the patently 
skewed demographic composition of the discipline.14
By placing the emphasis on institutional cultures, practices of direct or indirect 
discrimination come into sharper relief. However, such approaches are less effec-
tive when examining power dynamics that exist between the Global North and 
the Global South; between Anglophone and non-Anglophone publishing circuits; 
between institutionalised philosophy and those disciplines that philosophers 
sometimes consider insufficiently philosophical (e.g. anthropology, studies in re-
ligion); and between universities and alternative sites of pedagogy and learning. 
Sociological research tools suited to the analysis of a single institution - rates of 
participation and promotion, social experiences within classrooms and commit-
tees, and so on - may not so easily be extrapolated when seeking to explain the 
broad tendencies in the shaping of disciplinary priorities and boundaries within 
the global formations of research in continental philosophy. 
These two modes of criticism, idealist and sociological, each contribute to con-
temporary conversations about the historical legacies and future viability of 
continental philosophy. Increasing political scrutiny has been directed toward 
the nomenclature of “continental philosophy,” given the density of geopolitical 
meanings that attend continental both within and outside Europe. Definitions of 
continental philosophy vary wildly, from polemical indictments (often in com-
parisons with analytic philosophy) of continental thought as obscurantist and 
lacking in argumentative rigour, to culturalist accounts of continental philosophy 
as embedded in the national sentiments and orientations of French, German and 
other European thinkers, to canonical accounts of continental philosophy as in-
augurated by a radical European thinker who remains unacceptable within most 
Anglo-American philosophy, such as G.W.F. Hegel.15 It is sometimes altogether too 
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easy to nominate a definition of continental philosophy to suit one’s own critical 
purposes, depending on whether one adopts an idealist or sociological approach. 
Nevertheless, whatever definition one adopts, Maldonado-Torres’ assessment of 
a fundamental tension within continental philosophy remains compelling:
[Continental] philosophy does not denote a purely contingent relation 
among certain philosophers, but ... involves a certain commitment with 
Europe as the primordial site of philosophy and critique. Commitment 
with Europe involves peculiar conceptions of geopolitical space and his-
tory as well as of European and non-European peoples. 16
Maldonado-Torres’ argument can be read in both idealist and sociological ways. It 
can serve both as a description of systems of ideas that contain tacit understand-
ings of the superiority and indispensability of Europenness in critical thought, 
and as an indictment of the spatial, temporal and material conditions by which a 
discipline reproduces itself in relation to a (real or imagined) European centre, 
thereby excluding vast swathes of thinking that comes to be positioned as mar-
ginal. Of course, as Maldonado-Torres has noted, it may be that ideas developed 
by continental philosophers have equivalents in other intellectual traditions, and 
that certain tools from continental thinkers can be “utilized in a radical critique 
of coloniality.”17 Nevertheless, to the extent that continental philosophy under-
stands itself to have monopolised certain ways of thinking, the genuine diver-
sity of philosophical activity around the world—emerging over many millennia 
and extended across all continents—will continue to be evaluated in relation to 
the accepted canons and debates that animate continental philosophy. For this 
reason, before we consider the substantive claims made against particular kinds 
of thinking associated with continental philosophy, we want to note that disci-
plinarity and disciplinary boundaries pose a series of difficulties that cannot be 
overlooked when considering the consequences of expanding or abandoning the 
category of the continental.
“Disciplinary decadence” is the name that Lewis Gordon gives to the calcification 
of disciplines that seek to subsume all other disciplines and ways of thinking un-
der a uniform criteria for inclusion and exclusion:
Disciplinary decadence takes the form of one discipline assessing all oth-
er disciplines from its supposedly complete standpoint. It is the literary 
scholar who criticises work in other disciplines as not literary. It is the 
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sociologist who rejects other disciplines as not sociological. It is the histo-
rian who asserts history as the foundation of everything. It is the natural 
scientist that criticises the others for not being scientific. And it is also the 
philosopher who rejects all for not being properly philosophical.18
Against the tendency toward decadence that is certainly observable in some quar-
ters of philosophy, we should recall that philosophy has a long and enduring his-
tory of interdisciplinary collegiality and cross-pollination. Throughout the 17th 
and 18th centuries, European philosophers frequently conceived themselves as 
contributing to the broader project of scientific inquiry, allying itself with other 
enterprises searching for methodological consistency - physics, chemistry, biol-
ogy, economics, and so on. Richard Rorty argues that with Immanuel Kant and 
the 19th century post-Kantians, this perceived purpose of philosophy as an ally of 
the sciences slowly changed.19 In part through pressures of institutionalisation, 
philosophy was re-articulated as a foundation for, rather than complement to, 
the natural sciences and social sciences. The philosopher would now arbitrate the 
legitimate conditions of knowledge production underpinning those disciplines 
perceived to exist “downstream,” so to speak.20 Disciplinary decadence, from this 
viewpoint, emerged not simply from the inward-looking character of philosophy 
as a discipline, but from its self-appointed task in seeking to reveal the errors 
committed by other disciplines.
Two possible roles for the philosopher emerge from this historical transformation, 
as Rorty tells it. One role is that “of the cultural overseer who knows everyone’s 
common ground—the Platonic philosopher-king who knows what everybody else 
is really doing whether they know it or not, because he [sic] knows about the ul-
timate context (the Forms, the Mind, Language) within which they are doing it.”21 
This role can be seen at work in the scholarly practices identified by Moreton-
Robinson, Maldonado-Torres and Stephen Muecke, wherein non-European ways 
of knowing and theorising come to be conscripted by philosophers as “objects” of 
evaluation, rather than as opportunities for dialogue, interlocution, and mutual 
transformation.22 For Rorty, this philosopher-king role has eclipsed another pos-
sible role for philosophers, “the informed dilettante, the polypragmatic, Socrat-
ic intermediary between various discourses. In his salon, so to speak, hermetic 
thinkers are charmed out of their self-enclosed practices. Disagreements between 
disciplines and discourses are compromised or transcended in the course of the 
conversation.”23 To endorse this latter conception of philosopher as intermediary 
does not necessarily mean fetishising interdisciplinarity. The current enthusiasm 
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for interdisciplinary research in Australia, often driven opportunistically by re-
search quotas and grant funding models, can risk diverting attention from critical 
interrogations of the histories, purposes and limits of specific disciplinary forma-
tions.24 Nevertheless, we want to build on Rorty’s argument for more pragmatic 
and creative relationships between disciplines, including more flexibility in the 
vocabularies used by philosophers to support inter-disciplinary communication.
Continental philosophy in Australia occupies an interesting position in relation 
to disciplinarity. This is in part due to institutionalised divisions between ana-
lytic and continental philosophy (e.g. sharp demarcations between undergradu-
ate subject-offerings, journals, conferences and so on), and in part because of 
the interdisciplinary vigour of continental philosophy outside of demarcated phi-
losophy departments—albeit, often practiced in self-consciously undisciplinary 
or anti-disciplinary ways. At its best, scholarship across traditional and disciplin-
ary boundaries can produce moments of encounter that are potentially transfor-
mative, for thinkers, communities and schools of thought. As Thomas Ford has 
argued, disciplinary rigour and undisciplined vagueness, far from being oppos-
ing tendencies, may be “intertwined, even mutually generative.”25 Intellectual 
dialogues have the capacity to build enduring relationships that hold parties in 
responsibility to each other, and to each other’s investments and commitments. 
In neoliberal university environments organised around competitive metrics for 
output and impact, humanities scholars need strong, inter-connected academic 
communities through which to advocate for the worth of our labor, which so often 
cannot be sufficiently measured in monetary value or key performance indicators. 
Diversifying the themes, methods, and perceived canons of continental philoso-
phy may be an important way to transform the meanings attached to the “con-
tinental.” Nevertheless, we cannot escape the histories of colonial violence and 
epistemological injustice that have shaped imagined geographies of philosophi-
cal competence, including the prestige still accorded to “European thinkers” and 
Western European languages (especially English, French, and German). Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres’ articulation of post-continental philosophy may be useful for 
thinking through these issues:
Post-continentality is an expression of the idea that continents are not 
natural spaces, but projects that rely on specific notions of spatiality. In-
stead of seeking a dialectic between Europe and other continents, post-
continental philosophy suggests that the possibilities for generating and 
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grounding theory and philosophy are multiple and include a variety of spa-
tial and bodily references: the boat of the middle passage and the planta-
tion, the black and the Chicana body, the island and the archipelago, the 
reservation and the boarding school, the prison and the camp.26
Post-continental philosophy does not involve abandoning European philosophi-
cal works, but it does involve showing that “normative subjectivities or commu-
nities” embedded within European works do affect the priorities and limitations 
of this scholarship.27 Just as importantly, though, Maldonado-Torres argues for 
an entirely different way of situating philosophy in time and space, one that al-
lows for the “lived experience of dehumanization” to be acknowledged as a site 
from which thought is produced, rather than simply an object of thinking as it 
takes place in the academy.28 In this way, post-continental philosophy demands 
an alternative conception of the space of thinking. Rather than national cultures 
and national canon, Maldonado-Torres invites an engagement with “borderlands” 
(borrowing from Gloria Anzaldúa). These can be borders between “two people, 
between the people and those regarded nonpeople, and, between the non-people 
themselves—not in the continent or the nation.” 29 By its very nature, post-conti-
nental philosophy cannot be a privatised intellectual pursuit: it demands thinking 
about philosophy as a public, institutional practice, wherein the “post” becomes 
immanent to the communities that emerge across radically disparate spaces of 
thinking and being.
One problem with the concept of the otherwise generative concept of the “post-
continental” is that, like many of the neologisms that already circulate within con-
tinental philosophy, it may produce what Sara Ahmed calls “non-performatives,”30 
or speech acts that do not perform the action that they promise.31 There is a sig-
nificant gap  between what we often say about philosophy in aspirational terms, 
and what actually happens in the institutional and organisational formations of 
the discipline. In parallel discussions around “decolonisation” in academic re-
search, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang note “the ease with which the language of 
decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social 
sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical method-
ologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives.”32 Familiar initiatives 
underpinned by rights-based anti-discrimination frameworks may be expediently 
re-branded as “decolonial,” without eroding the constitutive relations between 
the colonial State (as the arbiter rights) and colonised peoples. We therefore 
need to acknowledge that, even if “post-continental philosophy” acquired greater 
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currency in Australian universities, this may not greatly transform the relation-
ship between Anglo-American and European-focused philosophy departments 
and publications, on the one hand, and research projects that are led by and cen-
tre Australian Indigenous voices and communities, on the other.  As three non-
Indigenous scholars trained both in continental philosophy and in humanities 
disciplines (e.g. literary studies, cultural studies) that continue to centre Anglo-
American and European scholarship, we are conscious that our capacities to read 
postcolonial and decolonial scholarship does not rectify this asymmetry between 
those positioned as researchers and those commonly cast as objects of research.33 
This hierarchical relationship between those who research and those discursively 
positioned as objects of research is rarely reversed within humanities research 
in Australia, although steps towards this have been taken. As Moreton-Robinson 
points out, “it is rarely considered that Indigenous people are extremely knowl-
edgeable about whites and whiteness. It is white scholars who have long been 
positioned as the leading investigators of the lives, values and abilities of Indig-
enous people.”34 In this context, we need to treat seriously the politico-economic 
dynamics that reward the modes of inhabiting whiteness that Moreton-Robinson 
describes. For example, there is no shortage of examples where non-European 
paradigms and political projects have simply been used to value-add whiteness, 
expanding its portfolios of inquiry without disturbing the institutional stratifica-
tion of knowledges and segregation of knowers. The problems faced by one com-
munity become the research outputs enjoyed by another. Further inquiry to these 
issues might investigate the under-citation of scholars in the Global South by 
scholars in the Global North both as an ideological issue, insofar as some regions 
are perceived by those in the Global North as less philosophically salient than 
others, and as an economic issue, insofar as scholars seek to capitalise on existing 
institutional privileges and social networks through collective self-citation (and 
for editors, exclusionist curatorial practices).35
These broad considerations around the political dimensions of disciplinary iden-
tity were present in the planning for the Australasian Society for Continental Phi-
losophy conference at the University of Tasmania in 2017. Hosting a conference 
in Sandy Bay in Hobart locates on the country of the Mouheneener people. This 
country bares a long history of European settler colonial violence in which sov-
ereignty was never ceded. As members of the conference organising committee, 
we were motivated by the questions: how do we engage feminist, ecological, and 
decolonial thought to critique the historical legacies of philosophy and to produce 
new concepts? What does it mean to work within and through these frameworks 
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in an Australasian context, especially given the awkward colonial imaginaries that 
sustain both “continental philosophy” and “Australasia”?36 Perhaps more acutely, 
if continental philosophy in this region has failed to sufficiently centre and attend 
to vital questions of gender, colonialism, and ecology, what is to be learned from 
this failure? What is worth bringing forward and what is better left behind? What 
does it mean to speak up, and when is it time to simply listen? 
The multimodal capacities of the academic conference seem to promise alterna-
tives to outputs fetish of the research university, even if this promise often feels 
unfulfilled. Despite the high levels of institutional scrutiny to which they can be 
subject, conferences are noticeably under-theorised as academic activities.37 They 
have the potential to cultivate what Tanja Dreher calls “political listening,” which 
involves not only the promotion of previously underrepresented voices (some-
thing that publishing may do, too), but the development of improved capacities 
for receptivity and responsiveness.38 These capacities are developed at the inter-
sections of textual and interpersonal practices. As Neil Gross and Crystal Fleming 
note, “conferences can be key sites for the social orchestration of academic knowl-
edge and for the intrusion of sociality into forms of social knowledge produc-
tion … that might at first glance seem to take place entirely within practitioners’ 
heads.”39 Against the masculinist mythos of the critical theorist who summons 
wisdom sui generis,40 conferences can make visible the collective conditions of 
creativity and erudition, and open onto those seemingly mundane problems that, 
in practical terms, may be more consequential than any singular piece of research: 
how much will the registration fees, and which variables are taken into account 
in the scaling of fees? How many bursaries are allocated for disadvantaged del-
egates, and under what criteria? How are disciplinary and sub-disciplinary align-
ments reinforced or challenged by the choice of keynotes and the organisation of 
plenaries and panels? How does the allocation of spaces and the organisation of 
the program determine which papers will receive an audience? To what extent do 
communicative protocols - around question and answer sessions, the contribu-
tions of session chairs, or in the Australian contexts, Welcomes to Country and 
Acknowledgements of Country - shape the social connections and collisions that 
conferences can (or cannot) make possible?41 
These questions may seem banal from the viewpoint of continental philosophy. 
But the experience of banality can be instructive, because intellectual divisions 
between the spectacular and the banal, the compelling and the pedestrian, are 
the effect of social processes. Logistical questions feel banal because the domi-
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nant concepts and traditions in continental philosophy have not been designed 
to answer them.42 As Achille Mbembe reminds us, in the context of the decolonial 
project in South Africa, shifting the institutional conditions for the production 
of knowledge require that we develop a greater awareness of the ways that spe-
cific infrastructures, such as the naming of institutional buildings and memorials, 
shapes the norms and priorities knowledge production.43 Nevertheless, knowl-
edge emerging from material practices and struggles is commonly dismissed as 
unstudied, while knowledge emerging from engagement with familiar textual 
canons is more readily accepted as rigorous. Put in Heideggerian terms, the quo-
tidian business of organisation comes to be regarded as “ontic,” while concept 
invention and critique are accorded status as “ontological.”44 A critical approach 
to continental philosophy might begin by re-mapping the diversity of skills and 
knowledges required to sustain a discipline, including those considered banal, 
pedestrian, or otherwise removed from the habituated objects of philosophical 
contemplation.
The prioritisation of equitable processes for hosting academic conference is not, 
of course, a panacea for the warts and worries of the neoliberal university. Con-
ferences can consecrate and naturalise existing social hierarchies, and further 
extend social capital for those most easily able to travel, to pay fees, to be in-
vited, and so on.45 There is no template for the perfectly transformative academic 
conference, although initiatives outside university institutions - such as the Bris-
bane Free University in Australia - suggest that it may not be salaried academics 
who are best equipped to envisage the future forms that continental philosophy 
events should take.46 We do maintain, nevertheless, that there is value in working 
through and foregrounding the often fraught political considerations that shape 
how conferences come into being and to hold out hope that, in bringing a schol-
arly community together, this work is not done in vain. 
This special issue draws together a variety of papers presented at the 2017 ASCP 
conference. It begins with Michelle Boulous Walker’s meditation on the impor-
tance collegiality as a space of political resistance to the neoliberal university. 
This piece was delivered at the inaugural ASCP postgraduate development day, 
which focussed on pathways to academic futures, institutional and professional 
wellbeing, and building intellectual communities beyond the academy. Walker ad-
vocates for the importance of collegiality within the modern university a site for 
social change. She describes this type of collegiality as “fragile and precarious” 
and implores us, in her contribution to this special issue, “to think more about 
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our relations with others within the university, than with our selves.”47 At the same 
time, Walker cautions us that any call to collegiality needs to be cognisant of the 
potentiality for exclusion and marginalisation, an issue that runs across the pa-
pers gathered for the ASCP plenary.
In the tradition of the ASCP, the 2017 conference hosted a plenary honouring the 
work of a significant Australasian philosopher, and on this occasion, the focus 
was on the extensive and diverse feminist philosophy of Professor Moira Gatens. 
The three articles celebrating Gatens’ work reflect the depth of her contribution 
across social and political philosophy, feminist philosophy, early modern philoso-
phy, and philosophy and literature. Louise Richardson-Self starts with Gatens’ 
ground-breaking 1983 publication “A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction,” 
and reads the central themes of this article, embodiment and social imaginaries, 
in relation to Gatens’ subsequent work. Timothy Laurie examines the ways that 
Gatens situates knowledge claims and speech acts within specific conditions of 
community formation, focusing on the way that “monstrous” ideologies and be-
liefs might be subject to contextualisation, without resorting to the static models 
of group consensus. In the final commentary on Gatens, Simone Bignall exam-
ines the contribution that Gatens makes to Spinoza studies. Bignall examines how 
Gatens works through Spinoza to articulate her concept of “imaginary bodies” in 
order to think about power, freedom and the right, and then examines the ways 
that Gatens uses this foundation to consider institutional arrangements of power. 
Finally, Bignall shows that Gatens is not only an exemplary feminist thinker but 
also “an imaginative philosopher whose associative methodology creates new pos-
sibilities for thought,” and who “presents a reconception of philosophy as a genre 
and a practice that strives to exert an imaginative power capable of changing and 
reshaping reality itself.”48
The plenary on Moira Gatens opens onto the broader questions around the sta-
tus of “European” thought in philosophy. The relationship between continental 
philosophy and other intellectual traditions are pursued in different ways through 
the special issue contributions from Elese Dowden, Anisha Sankar, Adrian Moore, 
and Briohny Walker. Adrian Moore’s “Dissolving the Conscious in Satori: Merleau-
Ponty and the Phenomenology of Suzuki’s Embodied Buddhism,” which maps 
complex associations between the flesh in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy, Gestalt psychology, the concept of Māya in Indian philosophical traditions, 
and the diverse bodies of work concerned with Satori in Buddhism (with a focus 
on Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki). While Moore’s piece uncovers unexpected resonanc-
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es between geographically disparate traditions, the remaining three articles place 
a greater emphasis on tensions between culturally-specific ways of knowing, es-
pecially those shaped by European colonialism. Dowden’s ‘Colonial Mind, Colo-
nised Body: Structural Violence and Incarceration in Aotearoa’ draws on research 
in settler colonial studies to identify ways that the “coloniality of being” shapes 
the lives of Māori communities, focusing on the normalisation of Pākehā (non-
Māori) identities through practices of governance and incarceration. Throughout, 
Dowden considers the way that the historical problem of settler colonial violence 
is displaced on Māori communities, who are in turned positioned as a “prob-
lem” to be managed by a State that elsewhere purports to endorse the virtues of 
multiculturalism. Extending these themes, Anisha Sankar places in dialogue the 
work on Frantz Fanon and Walter Benjamin, focusing on the status of “ruptures” 
in relation to anti-colonial and revolutionary struggles. In doing so, questions 
emerge around the value of Hegelian dialectics in both Fanon’s and Benjamin’s 
work, and Sankar draws on Lewis Gordon and Glen Coulthard to consider cri-
tique of recognition-based politics in contemporary decolonial scholarship. Fi-
nally, Briohny Walker’s essay “Precarious Time: Queer Anthropocene Futures” 
(awarded the ASCP prize for Postgraduate Essay) brings together queer theory 
and decolonial thought in order to explore what is left when the future promised 
by capitalism is no longer guaranteed or even desirable. Walker looks for alterna-
tive ways to navigate the future that rely neither on the reproductive futurism 
of hetero-patriarchal thought, nor on colonial modes of thinking about futures 
and about the earth. Working with queer ecology and Indigenous knowledges, she 
finds potential for the production of precarious Anthropocene subjectivities that 
emerge from the failures of capitalism, and that may promise alternative futures 
to those currently imagined within market-driven societies. 
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